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March 1970) Notes 
LABOR LAW-BANKRUPTCY-The Effect of the 
Bankruptcy of an Employer on the Employment 
Relationship and on Jurisdiction over Labor 
Disputes Involving the Employer 
739 
Litigation arising in connection with the recent bankruptcy of 
Turney Wood Products, Inc.,1 has brought into issue the general 
problem of the operation of a bankrupt employer under the fed-
eral labor laws.2 The provisions of both the federal labor laws 
and the Bankruptcy Act3 are clear in purpose, but in areas of their 
interaction they have produced jurisdictional confusion. The situa-
tion presented to a single court by the cases arising from the Turney 
Wood Products bankruptcy provided an ideal vehicle to resolve 
much of that confusion;4 in fact, the parties involved viewed it as a 
test-case situation.5 But the resulting decisions did not achieve the 
desired clarification. This Note will attempt to delineate the rights 
and responsibilities of the trustee in bankruptcy in his roles as 
trustee and employer and to identify the remedies available to the 
parties to a labor dispute which involves a bankrupt employer. 
In 1968, Turney Wood Products, Inc.,6 filed a voluntary petition 
1. Carpenters Local No. 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 
(W.D. Ark. 1968): Durand v. NLRB, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 23,602 (W .D. Ark. 1969). 
2. These laws include the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964) and the Labor Management Relations Act (hereinafter LMRA), 
29 u.s.c. §§ 141-67, I71-97 (1964). 
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-500 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
4. This opportunity to clarify the jurisdictional confusion was especially apparent 
since a single federal district court, with the same judge presiding, decided both 
Tumey and Durand and also acted as bankruptcy court. 
5. Durand v. NLRB, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 23,602, 23,606 (W.D. Ark. 1969): 
The court thinks that it has observed in this case an attitude on the part of 
some of the parties to ignore practicalities and to use this litigation involving a 
completely defunct business as a framework within which to vindicate abstract 
principles of labor-management relations, collective bargaining and Board juris-
diction. 
6. Turney Wood Products, Inc., was a manufacturer of church furniture sold in 
interstate commerce, and was thereby an employer "affecting commerce" within the 
meaning of the NLRA and LMRA. 59 CCH Lab. Cas. at 23,604. 
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in bankruptcy in the Western District of Arkansas. At that time, the 
company was in the second year of a three-year collective bargaining 
agreement with its union. 7 The contract specified wage rates, pro-
vided that layoffs and recalls would be governed by employee 
seniority, and set forth a grievance procedure that included com-
pulsory arbitration as a final step. The court8 appointed L. E. 
Durand as operating receiver-later trustee-and ordered that the 
plant be operated temporarily pending liquidation as provided in 
the Bankruptcy Act.9 Upon Durand's recommendation, the court 
authorized Durand, as trustee, to reject the collective bargaining 
agreement as an executory contract.10 Durand rejected the contract, 
reopened the plant without consulting the union, and recalled em-
ployees without regard to seniority and at substantially reduced wage 
rates. The union tendered specific grievances to the trustee based 
on these breaches of the agreement. Durand contended that he had 
properly exercised his right to reject the union contract, that there-
fore no contract capable of breach continued to exist, and that, as a 
further consequence, no grievance procedure had to be followed. 
The union then filed both a contract action under section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)11 and an unfair labor 
practice12 complaint with the National Labor Relations Board. 
In the section 301 suit, Carpenters Local Union No. 2746 v. 
Turney Wood Products, Incorporated,13 the union sought both 
specific enforcement of the arbitration provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement and review of the trustee's authority to reject 
the agreement. The union's position was that federal labor policies 
precluded the rejection of collective bargaining agreements and that 
consequently the terms of the union contract requiring arbitration 
were enforceable. The court rejected the union's contentions and 
held that the trustee may reject a collective bargaining agreement as 
he may reject any other executory contract.14 But, the court con-
7. The union involved was Carpenters Local Union No. 2'746, United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters &: Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. 
8. Judge Henley of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Arkansas sat as a court in bankruptcy pursuant to § 1 of the Bankruptcy Act: "(9) 
Court shall mean the judge or referee of the Court of Bankruptcy. (10) Court of 
Bankruptcy shall include the U.S. District Courts •••• " 11 U.S.C. § I (1964). 
9. Pursuant to § 2a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court may "[a)uthorize 
the business of bankrupts to be conducted for limited periods by receivers • • • or 
trustees, if necessary in the best interests of the estates •••• " 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(5) (1964). 
10. Such authorization is permitted by § 70b of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ llO(b) (1964). 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). See note 45 infra. 
12. As used in this Note, an unfair labor practice is any conduct which violates 
§§ 7 or 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1964). 
13. 289 F. Supp. 143 (W .D. Ark. 1968). 
14. 289 F. Supp. at 149. 
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tinued, its holding did not imply that an operating trustee can con-
tinue to operate a bankrupt plant without regard to the require-
ments of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Specifically, it 
stated that a trustee's refusal to bargain with the union concerning 
a new agreement may constitute an unfair labor practice.15 
Subsequent to the court's Turney decision, the regional director 
of the NLRB ordered a hearing on the union's unfair labor practice 
complaint. The trial examiner found that Durand had been guilty 
of failing to maintain the employment conditions which existed at 
the time of rejection of the contract until he had bargained with the 
union concerning the changes proposed, and that this failure consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice. The trustee then sought an injunc-
tion against any further proceedings by the Board on the unfair 
labor practice charges. In Durand v. NLRB, 16 the court refused to 
enjoin the unfair labor practice proceedings. Instead, it accepted the 
Board's position that the trustee's subsequent departure from the 
terms of the rejected contract was an act separate from the rejection 
and hence was a unilateral change in the contract terms-an action 
which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) of 
the NLRA and is thus within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.17 
Consequently, the court stated, the Board's proceedings were not an 
attempt to relitigate or circumvent the court's earlier affirmance of 
the trustee's power to reject.18 
Although the court's characterization of the departure from the 
terms of the rejected contract as an unfair labor practice may be 
questioned,19 the Turney and Durand decisions rest, for the most 
part, on a correct assessment of the rights of a trustee in a bank-
ruptcy to reject a collective bargaining agreement and of his duties 
under federal labor law. A United States district court sitting as a 
court of bankruptcy has exclusive jurisdiction of the bankrupt 
estate20 and can authorize the trustee to operate the bankrupt busi-
ness.21 When the trustee finds any executory contract to be unduly 
burdensome to that operation,22 he is authorized by the Bankruptcy 
15. 289 F. Supp. at 149. 
16. 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 23,602 (\V .D. Ark. 1969). 
17. 59 CCH Lab. Cas. at 23,605. 
18. 59 CCH Lab. Cas. at 23,608. 
19. See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra. 
20. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2, Ill, 311, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11, 511, 711 (1964); 59 CCH Lab. 
Cas. at 23,606. 
21. Bankruptcy Act §§ 189, 343, 11 U.S.C. §§ 589, 743 (1964). See note 9 supra. 
22. "The inference is that if the contract were shown to be sufficiently burdensome 
it might be set aside.'' Note, Corporate Reorganizations and the Rights of Labor, 53 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1360, 1363 (1940). "Its [section 70b] underlying principle and that of 
the cases that preceded its enactment is that the trustee in bankruptcy may abandon 
any burdensome property and reject unprofitable executory contracts in order to 
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Act to reject that contract upon approval of the court.23 a union 
collective bargaining agreement in force at the time of bankruptcy 
is an executory contract within the meaning of the Act,24 although 
the Bankruptcy Act does not specifically so designate it.25 Neither 
federal labor legislation nor the Bankruptcy Act indicates that a 
collective bargaining agreement is excluded from this power to 
reject executory contracts;26 and indeed, some courts have sustained 
the trustee's rejection of union contracts.27 This result appears to be 
sound since termination of the collective bargaining agreement by 
rejection is necessary to secure the objectives of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, which are to dispose of all claims against the bankrupt 
business and, in the case of reorganization, to remove potential ob-
stacles to the rehabilitation of the business.28 Thus, upon a showing 
of proper justification, a trustee may be authorized by the court of 
bankruptcy to reject a collective bargaining agreement; and the 
bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over that rejection. 
The Turney holding indicates, however, that the power to reject 
a union contract does not allow the trustee to operate a bankrupt 
further the best interests of the estate." In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 
143 F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
23. See § 70b with respect to pure bankruptcy, II U.S.C. § IIO(b) (1964); § 116(1) 
with respect to chapter X reorganizations, II U.S.C. § 516(1) (1964); § 313(1) with 
respect to chapter XI arrangements, II U.S.C. § 713(1) (1964). 
24. In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959): 
"The Bankruptcy Act makes no distinction among classes of executory contracts. 
The power to permit rejection of an executory contract should be exercised where 
rejection is to the advantage of the estate." ..• [T]here should be no differentiation 
in the treatment of executory employment or collective bargaining contracts as 
to termination. 
25. 6 w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,I 3.23, at 563 (14th ed. 1969). 
26. "[A]s a matter of statutory construction, the •.. rejection of labor contracts 
would not be impossible." Teton, Reorganization Revisited, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 596 
(1939). The Bankruptcy Act provides, in straight bankruptcy under § 70b, for rejection 
of "an executory contract," II U.S.C. § IIO(b) (1964). A chapter X reorganization 
plan "may provide for the rejection of any executory contract except contracts in the 
public authority." Bankruptcy Act § 216(4), II U.S.C. § 616(4) (1964). Finally, a 
chapter XI arrangement "may include .•. provisions for the rejection of any executory 
contract." Bankruptcy Act § 357(2), II U.S.C. § 757(2) (1964). 
27. Turney is the first case holding that a collective bargaining agreement may be 
rejected under § 70b. 289 F. Supp. at 149. Other cases have upheld the power to reject 
union agreements under § 116 and § 313. See, e.g., In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. 
Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (§ 313); In re Public Ledger, 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), 
revd. on other grounds, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (§ 116). 
28. The main purpose of § 70b, when the bankrupt estate is being liquidated, is 
"to clarify at the earliest possible moment the mutual relations of the contracting 
parties" so that prompt distribution of the assets can be made. 4A W. COLLIER, BANK· 
RUPTCY ,r 70.43, at 536 (14th ed. 1969). In the case of reorganization, the purpose of 
rejection is to discharge any executory obligations which would impede the rehabilita-
tion of the business. See City Bank Farmers Trust v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433 
(1937). In either case, those who hold executory contracts properly rejected should be 
entitled to share in the estate as creditors. See 6A ,v. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,r 9.20, 
at 275, 276 n.3 (14th ed. 1969). 
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business without regard to the requirements of the NLRA.29 When 
the trustee exercises his authority to reject a collective bargaining 
agreement, that contract ceases to control the relationship between 
employer and union. From that time, employer-employee relations 
are governed by the federal labor laws.30 The NLRB is vested with 
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of the NLRA.31 
There is no conflict with the Bankruptcy Act in this regard: the 
NLRA confers on the Board the power to prevent any person from 
engaging in unfair labor practices,32 and the Act expressly includes 
trustees and receivers in bankruptcy.33 Correspondingly, the Bank-
ruptcy Act prohibits trustees in reorganization from interfering with 
employees' rights to organize.34 Besides, it is generally recognized 
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court does not bar 
the NLRB from issuing proper orders in labor disputes arising 
during reorganization. 35 
The fact that a trustee in bankruptcy is operating a business does 
not alter the employer-employee relationship with respect to how it 
may be governed by law.36 The trustee may be found guilty of unfair 
labor practices for violating his duties under the NLRA after he has 
properly rejected a union contract under the Bankruptcy Act.37 In 
addition, the incumbent union does not lose its status as bargaining 
representative of the bankrupt's employees simply because of the 
bankruptcy proceedings and the trustee's assumption of the em-
ployer's position;38 and the NLRA imposes an obligation on the 
29. 289 F. Supp. at 149. 
30. NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942). A debtor 
which continues in possession of its property and in the conduct of its business during 
reorganization is responsible for unfair labor practices under the NLRA; the status 
of a debtor in this area is the same as that of any other employer. See 6A "\\T. COLLIER, 
BANKRUPTCY ~ 8.14, at 56 (14th ed. 1969). 
31. "The power_ 'to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice 
affecting commerce' has been vested by Congress in the Board and the Courts of Ap-
peal, and Congress has declared: 'This power shall be exclusive, and shall not be 
affected by any other means of adjustment.'" Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 48 (1938). 
32. Section IO of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964) (emphasis added), provides: 
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from 
engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. This power shall not 
be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has or may be 
established. 
33. According to § 2{a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1964), "(I) The term 
'person' includes ••• trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." 
34. Bankruptcy Act § 272, 11 U.S.C. § 672 (1964). 
35. See, e.g., Note, Bankruptcy: Corporate Reorganization: Survey of Chapter X 
in Operation, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. R.Ev. 399, 426 (1941). 
36. 6A w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ~ 8.14, at 55-56 &: 56 n.19 (14th ed. 1969). 
37. See notes 32-33 supra. 
38. "Its [the trustee in bankruptcy's] status as an employer is no different, so far 
as the [NLRA] is concerned, than that of any other employer. Court supervision of 
corporate reorganization affords the operating possessor no freedom from its statutory 
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trustee as employer to bargain collectively with the certified union 
representative of the employees.39 It has been held in the nonbank-
ruptcy context that, when there is a change of employer, it is an 
unfair labor practice for the new employer to refuse to bargain with 
the union, at its request, concerning continued conditions and terms 
of employment.40 The general rule is that when there is a duty to 
bargain, any unilateral change in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment is an unfair labor practice.41 However, when the obliga-
tion to bargain has been satisfied and the negotiations are at an 
impasse, the employer is free to effectuate such changes as have been 
proposed to, and rejected by, the union.42 It is not clear, however, 
that this general rule is adaptable to the situation in which the em-
ployer is a trustee in bankruptcy.43 
In Turney, after the trustee properly rejected the contract and 
departed from its terms, the union sought specific performance of 
the contract's arbitration procedures. In view of the state of the law 
as set forth above, 44 and in view of the fact that the contract was 
duly rejected, the court properly denied that relief. It is submitted, 
however, that the basis of the court's dismissal of the union's specific 
performance suit was erroneous. The union's request for specific 
duty to its employees." NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 43 (3d 
Cir. 1942). "The bargaining relationship does not automatically terminate with a 
change in employers. 'It is well settled that, where there is substantial continuity in 
the identity of the employing enterprise, the purchasing employer is bound to 
recognize and bargain with the incumbent union' [Northwest Galvanizing Co., 168 
N.L.R.B. No. 6 (Oct. 31, 1967)].'' Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Suc-
cessor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 791 (1969). 
39. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964), provides: "It shall 
be an unfair labor practice for an employer ••. to refuse to bargain collectively with 
the representatives of his employees." 
40. Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965). For discussion of the successor 
doctrine with respect to the trustee in bankruptcy as employer, see text accompanying 
notes 83-91 infra. 
41. "We hold that an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment 
under negotiation is similarly a violation of 8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the 
duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of 8(a)(5) as much as does a flat 
refusal." NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). See also NLRB v. C &: C Plywood 
Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967). But for discussion of the unilateral change doctrine when 
the employer is a trustee in bankruptcy who has properly rejected a collective bar• 
gaining agreement, see text accompanying notes 62-65 infra. 
42. "The obligation to refrain from altering terms and conditions of employment 
prior to fulfillment of the bargaining obligation is only temporary; once the bar-
gaining obligation has been satisfied, and negotiations at an impasse, the employer 
is free to effectuate such changes as have been proposed to and rejected by the union," 
Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 
735, 811 (1969). See, e.g., NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1963). How-
ever, an impasse caused by an employer's refusal to bargain in good faith has been 
held to be an unfair labor practice. Industrial Union of Marine &: Shipbuilding 
Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964). 
43. See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra. 
44. See text accompanying notes 20-42 supra. 
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performance of the contract, filed under section 301 of the LMRA,45 
alleged that the action of the trustee rejecting the collective bargain-
ing agreement constituted a breach of that agreement.46 The court 
in Turney held that the rejection did not amount to a breach and 
that the union was not entitled to specific performance;47 conse-
quently, it dismissed the suit. The error of this holding lies in the 
court's failure to recognize that rejection of an executory contract 
does constitute a breach of the contract48 and that the union as the 
injured party becomes entitled to any remedy afforded by law, 
although specific performance is obviously not the proper relief 
when a contract has been properly rejected by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy.49 
The court's ruling that the rejection did not constitute a breach 
was apparently an attempt to avoid the difficult question raised 
by the union concerning the potential conflict between the federal 
labor laws and the Bankruptcy Act.50 But this problem must be 
45. Section 30l(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), provides that suits for violations of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization which represents employees 
in an industry affecting commerce may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties. 
46. "[I']he complaint in that case [Turney] alleged that the action of the trustee 
in rejecting the collective bargaining agreement constituted a breach of that agree-
ment, and that the union was entitled to have the agreement specifically enforced." 
59 CCH Lab. Cas. at 23,607. 
47. 289 F, Supp. at 149; 59 CCH Lab. Cas. at 23,607. 
48. "[T]he rejection of an executory contract . . . as provided in this title, shall 
constitute a breach of such contract." Bankruptcy Act § 63c, 11 U.S.C. § 103(c} (1964). 
Rejection under§ ll6 is also a breach [Bankruptcy Act § 202, 11 US.C. § 602 (1964)], 
as is rejection in a chapter XI arrangement [Bankruptcy Act § 353, 11 U.S.C. § 753 
(1961)]. 
49. See text accompanying notes 82-92 infra. However, in a proper case for the 
exercise of § 301 jurisdiction, a court could grant appropriate relief even if the remedy 
requested is inappropriate. Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
50. The union claimed that federal legislation in labor relations had so pre-
empted the field as to take collective bargaining agreements out of the scope of the 
power under the Bankruptcy Act to reject executory contracts. The court in 
Turney feared that "to uphold the contention of the union would imply a conflict 
between federal legislation in the labor relations field ••. and the Bankruptcy Act." 
289 F. Supp. at 147. While no necessary conflict appears to exist in reality, there 
has been substantial confusion in the law concerning the status of employer-employee 
relations in trustee operations under the Bankruptcy Act. By dismissing the union's 
§ 301 suit, the court avoided addressing that confusion, 
The NLRA was enacted in 1935; the Chandler version of the Bankruptcy Act, which 
first set forth the power of a trustee to reject executory contracts (289 F. Supp. at 148), 
was enacted in 1938. From 1938 to 1941, a rather active legal debate arose as to 
whether a collective bargaining agreement could be rejected as an executory con-
tract. It was argued that inclusion of union contracts in the power under the Bank-
ruptcy Act to reject executory contracts would frustrate the federal labor policy. 
Although equity receivers have been held not bound by prior labor agreements, 
tl1e purpose of the legislative protection of the employees right to organize freely 
was to enable them to conclude collective agreement with their employers, and 
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faced, for it has been held that while a collective bargaining agree-
ment can be rejected under the Bankruptcy Act, such rejection does 
constitute a breach of the agreement51 and the trustee is still subject 
to the provisions of the NLRA dealing with unfair labor practices.152 
The question of when a union contract can be rejected is one that 
remains largely unanswered today, and its resolution rests primarily 
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over rejection of executory contracts, in-
cluding a union collective bargaining agreement;53 and the final 
decision to reject the union contract lies with the bankruptcy 
court.54 The court must determine whether the trustee's decision to 
reject a contract as burdensome is justified by the best interests of 
the bankrupt estate.55 Once rejection has been authorized by the 
bankruptcy court and the contract is rejected, the remedies and 
fora available to the union for relief from that rejection must be 
determined. 
Three fora come to mind as potentially available to provide 
relief: the NLRB, the court of bankruptcy,56 and a federal district 
court sitting under section 301. The union should not be able to 
obtain relief from the NLRB. Since a breach of contract generally 
does not itself constitute an unfair labor practice,57 the Board's juris-
diction does not attach unless the breach arises out of the same 
transaction as does an unfair labor practice, in which case the 
Board's jurisdiction may be concurrent with that of a court sitting 
under section 301.58 It is difficult, however, to conceive of circum-
stances in which an unfair labor practice could be said to arise out 
to allow these agreements to be set aside would seem contrary to the policy of 
this legislation. 
Note, Corporate Reorganizations and the Rights of Labor, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1360, 
1363 (1940). 
51. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. 
52. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text. 
53. See notes 23·24 supra and accompanying text. 
54. Acts of trustees pursuant to § 70b are under the control of the court. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 2a(21), II U.S.C. § ll(a)(21) (1964). Sections ll6 and 313 speak of the 
court itself as authorizing any rejection. 11 U.S.C. §§ 602, 753 (1964). 
55. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. 
56. It should be recalled that the court of bankruptcy may mean either the judge 
of a federal district court or a referee appointed by the court. See note 8 supra. 
57. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 
195 (1962); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Co., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). 
58. "The authority of the Board to deal with unfair labor practices which also 
violate a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by section 301, but it is 
not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under sec-
tion 301." Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962). See also NLRB v. 
C &: C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967). 
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of the same transaction as the rejection.59 Although rejection is 
similar in scope and effects to a total repudiation of a collective 
bargaining agreement-which in the normal employment situation 
has been held to constitute an unfair labor practice to which the 
Board's jurisdiction would attach60-rejection by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy should be distinguished. Rejection under the Bankruptcy Act 
lacks the elements of an unjustified refusal by the employer to abide 
by the terms of an agreement. Indeed, unlike repudiation, rejection 
must not only be justified by the needs of the bankrupt, but it must 
also be approved by a court of bankruptcy. Moreover, the procedure 
of rejection by a trustee is specifically sanctioned by Congress in the 
Bankruptcy Act.61 
But it might be argued, as the Board did in Durand,62 that a 
departure by the trustee from the terms of the rejected contact, 
59. There are essentially two situations in the normal employment setting in 
which both an unfair labor practice and a breach of contract have been found to 
arise out of the same transaction so as to produce concurrent jurisdiction in the Board 
and in the § 301 court. The first is the case in which the parties have incorporated 
into their collective bargaining agreement a provision which parallels an unfair labor 
practice section of the NLRA so that the same conduct may arguably violate both the 
contract and the NLRA. See, e.g., Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
Clearly, even in the bankruptcy setting, if the trustee commits an actual unfair labor 
practice, he is subject to the Board's jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 29-35 
supra. In this setting, however, a trustee's unilateral departure from the terms of the 
rejected agreement does constitute an unfair labor practice. The fuct that the Bank-
ruptcy Act establishes a procedure for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement 
necessarily implies that the trustee may depart from the terms of the rejected contract 
without committing an unfair labor practice. Otherwise, rejection could become a 
nullity. See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra. 
The second situation which may produce both an unfair labor practice and a 
breach of contract and which may thus permit concurrent jurisdiction, is the situa-
tion in which conduct that would otherwise constitute an unfair labor practice is 
arguably sanctioned by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and there-
fore is arguably not an unfair labor practice. An example of such conduct is a change 
in working conditions by an employer which, if not sanctioned by the agreement, 
would be a unilateral change and an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 
369 U.S. 736 (1962). As was noted above, however, it is unacceptable in the bank-
ruptcy setting to treat the trustee's departure from the terms of the rejected contract 
as an unfair labor practice. See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra. For more exten-
sive discussion of jurisdictional overlap, see Note, Labor Law-]urisdiction-Contrac-
tllal Interpretation, Unfair Labor Practices, and Arbitration: A Proposed Resolution 
of Jurisdictional Overlap, 68 MrcH. L. REv. 141 (1969). 
60. It has been held that, in ordinary employment situations, repudiation of a 
collective bargaining agreement by an employer is a § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain 
which gives the NLRB jurisdiction to exercise its remedial powers. Hydes Super-
market, 145 N.L.R.B. 1252, enforced, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964). This interpretation 
of § 8(a)(5) is derived from the definition of the duty to bargain collectively which 
is found in § S(d) of the NLRA. The proviso to that section states that "where there 
is in effect a collective bargaining contract ••• the duty to bargain collectively shall 
also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract" 
unless he follows certain specified procedures. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). 
61. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
62. See text accompanying note 17 supra. 
748 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68 
either at the time of rejection or subsequent to it, constitutes an 
unfair labor practice so as to give rise to concurrent jurisdiction in 
the Board and the courts over the rejection. Such an argument 
would be based on the fact that, in normal employment circum-
stances, any unilateral change in conditions of employment is an 
unfair labor practice.63 In the bankruptcy situation, however, a de-
parture from the terms of the rejected contract should not constitute 
an unfair labor practice, whether or not bargaining has preceded 
that departure. It is evident that to treat such a departure as a uni-
lateral change could deprive rejection of much of its utility. 64 Thus, 
the departure should be treated as an integral part of the rejection 
instead of as a separate act that could constitute an unfair labor 
practice. 
Even if the departure is treated as a unilateral change and the 
Board does take jurisdiction of an unfair labor practice complaint 
based on it, the Board must recognize the limitations on it ability 
to relieve the union from the consequences of the rejection and 
breach. Although in the nonbankruptcy setting the Board can order 
the restoration of the status quo prior to the unilateral change, oG 
such a remedy for rejection would conflict both with the orders of 
the court of bankruptcy and with the primary objective of rejection 
-to free the bankrupt from some of those prior conditions of em-
ployment. Moreover, the possibility of the Board's ordering resto-
ration of the status quo would give a union-creditor a unique 
opportunity to attack decisions of the bankruptcy court outside the 
normal process of review and could impose upon the trustee the 
63. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. 
64. See text accompanying note 28, 59 stipra. 
65. The NLRB has the power, in remedying an unfair labor practice, to order 
the reinstatement of employees with back pay and a return to conditions that existed 
prior to the unfair labor practice. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 
203 (1964). If departure by a trustee from the terms of a rejected collective bargaining 
agreement is called a unilateral change, and hence an unfair labor practice, the 
Board would appear to be able to order restoration of the status quo which existed 
before the rejection and departure that constituted the unfair labor practice. But 
such a remedy, as has been pointed out, would frustrate the purposes of the Bank• 
ruptcy Act. This interference can be avoided simply by recognizing that departure 
is integral to rejection and should not be treated as an unfair labor practice. 
A remedial conflict might still arise in cases in which the Board assumed juris-
diction over an unfair labor practice charge which was based on a trustee's refusal 
to bargain after he had rejected a collective agreement and had departed from its 
tenns. That assumption of jurisdiction, as has been demonstrated, would be proper. 
See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra. But if the Board, in remedying such a 
refusal to bargain, ordered restoration of the pre-departure status quo, conflict would 
arise both with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and with the orders of the court 
of bankruptcy. Restoration of the status quo prior to departure is clearly not an 
appropriate remedy for a subsequent refusal to bargain. Unlike the unfair labor 
practice in Fibreboard which involved a unilateral change, the unfair labor practice 
in the case posed consists of a refusal to bargain after an authorized departure from 
the terms of the rejected agreement. Even if an order to restore the status quo prior 
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impossible task of obeying the conflicting orders of two fora. It 
would not seem to be enough, however, for the Board simply to 
avoid issuing directly conflicting orders; the Board would also have 
to avoid fashioning a remedy that would undermine the ability of 
the court of bankruptcy to administer the bankrupt's estate. It is 
difficult to see how a remedy for departure from the terms of a 
rejected contract would not to some degree impose additional bur-
dens upon a bankrupt employer and hence undermine the oper-
ations and orders of the bankruptcy court. It is submitted that the 
best solution to these problems is to avoid them by treating depar-
ture as integral to rejection, and thus as an improper basis for 
invoking the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board. 
Of course, if the trustee commits an unfair labor practice sep-
arate from his rejection of the agreement-that is, an action other 
than a departure from the contract terms-the union may file an 
unfair labor practice complaint with the NLRB.66 For example, 
when, as in the Turney Wood Products cases, a rejection of a con-
tract is followed by a separate, subsequent refusal of the trustee 
to bargain with the union concerning a new employment agree-
ment, jurisdiction lies either in a district court sitting under section 
301 or in the bankruptcy court, for the breach of contract, and in 
the NLRB for the unfair labor practice. 
However, since rejection by itself appears to constitute only 
a breach of contract, over which the Board may not exercise juris-
diction, the union must look either to the court of bankruptcy or 
to a court sitting under section 301 for relief from the trustee's 
breach. When a trustee rejects a collective bargaining agreement, 
all of its terms cease to be binding;67 consequently, the union must 
seek relief from the loss of all provisions of the rejected union 
to the unfair labor practice is appropriate in the case of a mere refusal to bargain, 
that order should be to reinstate only those conditions which existed after the depar-
ture, since only the post-departure conduct should be able to constitute an unfair 
labor practice. A reasonable construction of § IO(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 
(1964), which is the source of the Board's power to order "affirmative action" to 
remedy unfair labor practices, confirms this conclusion, because it speaks only to the 
questions of remedying the unfair labor practice and not to issues involving activities 
prior to the commission of the unfair labor practice. Even if the Board should con-
strue § IO(c) broadly enough to give it the power to order restoration of the pre-
departure situation as a remedy for a refusal to bargain, due consideration for the 
bankruptcy situation should restrain its exercise of that power. 
66. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra. 
67. It seems clear that the trustee must reject the entire contract-that is, that 
he cannot reject some parts of a collective bargaining agreement while retaining other 
parts. Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act states that the trustee must either assume 
or reject all executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § II0(b) (1964). The general application 
of this section has been that when a trustee decides to assume a contract, he must 
take it "cum onere"-subject to all its provisions. 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.43, 
at 519 (14th ed. 1969). 
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agreement. The intangible nature of many of the union and em-
ployee rights which are represented in the collective bargaining 
agreement indicates that adequate relief from the consequences of 
the rejection of the contract requires more than the monetary com-
pensation that is available to the union as an ordinary creditor of 
the bankrupt. Especially in the case of a reorganization, the con-
tinued operation of the bankrupt's business by a trustee continues 
the employment relationship and thus perpetuates the harm to the 
union resulting from the breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 68 Thus a legal remedy alone would be inadequate, and a full 
range of equitable remedies is required in order to fashion proper 
relief for the union. Both a bankruptcy court and a court sitting 
under section 301 action have full powers in equity to provide 
appropriate relief,69 and therefore any preference for one of those 
courts must rest on other factors. 
There is no authority for the proposition that a court sitting 
under section 301 should have exclusive jurisdiction over suits aris-
ing from the rejection in bankruptcy of collective bargaining agree-
ments. But the literal terms of section 301 do encompass such 
suits,70 and therefore it appears that those suits are at least within 
the jurisdiction of a court sitting under that section. Although it 
cannot be said that Congress actually contemplated that a section 
301 court would take jurisdiction of suits arising from rejection, 
section 301 does embody a congressional policy to make a specific 
forum available for suits involving collective bargaining agreements. 
Moreover, from the time when the rejection power was made 
available under the Bankruptcy Act, there has been concern that 
it should not be used to infringe unnecessarily the union and 
employee rights which are protected by the federal labor laws.71 
68. This problem would be greater in cases of a long-term chapter X reorg:miza-
tion and of a chapter XI arrangement than it would be when the business is being 
operated only until liquidation. Bankruptcy Act§§ 189, 343, II U.S.C. §§ 5II, 711 (1964). 
69. The Bankruptcy Act § 2a vests bankruptcy courts with the jurisdiction both 
at law and in equity. II U.S.C. § II(a) (1964). "Equitable principles govern the e.x-
ercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966). 
Similarly, a federal district court sitting under § 301 would have available all 
normal equity powers; the appropriateness of equitable relief in suits under that sec-
tion has been recognized. The Supreme Court in defining the § 301 suit, quoted from 
the Congressional Record that "[p)roceedings in district courts contemplate not only 
the ordinary lawsuits for damages but also such other remedial proceedings, both legal 
and equitable, as might be appropriate in the circumstances." Textile Workers Union 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). The concurring opinion of Justice Burton in 
the same case speaks of the remedial powers of a court in a § 301 suit as having their 
"source in Section 301 itself, and in the federal district courts' inherent equitable 
powers." 353 U.S. at 460. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c), note 49 supra. 
70. Section 301 provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts ••• may be brought 
in any District Court" 29 U.S.C. § 155 (1964). Thus, any suit based upon a rejection 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement would appear to fall within the statute. 
71. See note 50 supra. 
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Since collective bargaining agreements do involve substantial inter-
ests not present in other executory contracts encompassed by the 
bankruptcy rejection power, it may be desirable to provide an 
opportunity for the protection of those interests in an action outside 
of the ordinary bankruptcy proceeding. It is arguable that a court 
sitting under section 301 could, without neglecting the special needs 
of the bankruptcy situation, bring greater objectivity to bear on the 
substance of the union's claims than could the court of bankruptcy, 
and that therefore the interests of the union and of federal labor 
policy would be better protected by an action outside the general 
bankruptcy proceedings.72 
Although these arguments and the literal wording of section 
30178 suggest that a union might be able to invoke that section in 
seeking a remedy for the rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, it must be recognized that the union is clearly entitled to 
file a claim in the bankruptcy court, since, upon rejection, it be-
comes a creditor of the bankrupt.74 Moreover, the bankruptcy court 
has exclusive power to administer the liquidation or reorganization 
of a bankrupt employer. Even if a remedial order issued by a court 
sitting under section 301 attempted to deal only with interests 
peculiar to labor relations, such as job classification, seniority, or 
union security, the resolution of these matters would be likely to 
have economic repercussions and thus affect the ability of the bank-
ruptcy court to administer the bankrupt estate effectively. In addi-
tion, the bankruptcy court has exclusive authority to determine 
72. E.xcept in proceedings involving a chapter X reorganization, the proceedings 
in a bankruptcy court are conducted by a referee appointed by the federal district 
judge. Bankruptcy Act § 22, 11 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). The referee is a specialist in bank• 
, uptcy and would bring this background, as well as his experience with the present 
ca~e. to his decisions on the union's claim. A judge sitting in a § 301 suit, on the 
other hand, would be less likely to have predispositions based on bankruptcy oper-
ations and would probably be unfamiliar with the particular case-again, except 
in proceeding,; involving a chapter X reorganization in which the judge who has 
pre,ided in the bankruptcy court is a federal district judge and may also be the 
judge in the § 301 action. See Bankruptcy Act § ll7, 11 U.S.C. § 517 (1964). 
n. See note 70 supra. 
U. While the Bankruptcy Act does not state specifically that rejection under 
§ 70b makes the injured party a creditor, it does speak of creditors as persons who 
have a claim "void or voidable under this title." Bankruptcy Act § 57, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 93 (1964). Rejection pursuant to §§ 116 and 313, however, clearly makes the in• 
_jured party a creditor: "Any person injured by such rejection shall ••• be deemed 
a creditor." II U.S.C §§ 602, 753 (1964). The courts have recognized the right of 
any party injured by rejection of an executory contract to participate in the bank• 
ruptcy proceedings as a creditor: "The remedy [of a party whose executory contract 
has been rejected by the trustee] is a claim for damages for the breach of the agree-
ment.'' In re New York Inve;tors :\Iut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
There is no evidence that a labor union is an exception to this rule. Thus, after 
a trustee rejects a collective bargaining agreement, "[t]he union apparently could 
then intervene in the proceedings as a general creditor and prove damages suffered 
by the termination of its contract." Note, Corporate Reorganizations and the Rights 
of Labol', 53 HARV, L. REV. 1360, 1363 (1940), 
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what constitutes administrative expenses entitled to priority;75 and 
presumably, its cooperation in the exercise of this power would be 
essential to give effect to any order of the section 301 court which 
would increase the costs of operation of the bankrupt business. 
Furthermore, if the bankruptcy court, in an effort to protect its 
ability to administer the bankrupt estate, should countermand the 
order of the section 301 court, there would be an unseemly conflict 
between the two federal fora. These considerations suggest that 
the action under section 301 should not be available to the union 
at its option. Vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the court of bank-
ruptcy over all claims arising from rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements has the further advantage of permitting the resolution 
of all claims against the bankrupt in a single action, and it thus 
promotes promptness and efficiency of adjudication. Finally, the 
fact that the bankruptcy court possesses the full range of equitable 
powers76 and that all decisions in bankruptcy proceedings are either 
made in, or are immediately appealable to, the federal district court, 
render the benefits to be gained by an action under section 301, in 
another or even in the same federal district court, somewhat diffi-
cult to perceive. 
The conclusion that the bankruptcy court should have exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims arising from the rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement does not mean that a court sitting under 
section 301 may never play a role in the resolution of problems 
arising from such a rejection. There appear to be two instances 
when union claims for rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment can be accommodated by a section 301 court without inter-
fering with bankruptcy proceedings. First, a bankruptcy court may 
defer on the question of a union claim to the section 301 court. 
Such deference would not be inconsistant with the operation of 
policies of the Bankruptcy Act. Indeed, prior to the enactment of 
section 301, Congress recognized that, in certain areas of labor 
relations, matters otherwise within the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion should be handled by other agencies;77 and the bankruptcy 
court itself has always given up jurisdiction to agencies which are 
especially competent and specifically designated to deal with certain 
areas.78 For example, Congress has specifically prohibited the bank-
ruptcy court from interfering with collective bargaining involving 
75. Bankruptcy Act §§ 62, 64, 11 U.S.C. §§ 102, 104 (1964). 
76. See note 69 supra. 
77. See notes 79·80 infra and accompanying text. 
78. "An agency especially competent and specifically designated to deal with {the 
problem] has been created by Congress. Under these circumstances the court should 
exercise equitable discretion to give that agency the first opportunity to pass on the 
issue." Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946). See also 6A w. 
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ~ 15.14, at 1285 (14th ed. 1969). 
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carriers subject to the Railway Labor Act,79 and the Bankruptcy 
Act defers to the jurisdiction of the NLRB with regard to bank-
ruptcy operations involving sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.80 Al-
though the district court sitting under section 30 I cannot be said 
to be especially competent in matters involving collective bargaining 
agreements, that court has been specifically designated by Congress 
to remedy violations of such agreements. Therefore, the bankruptcy 
court might well make use of that forum to resolve claims of a union 
arising from the rejection of its collective bargaining agreement, 
especially if it appeared that those questions would unduly compli-
cate the proceedings before the court of bankruptcy. If a referee, as 
opposed to a district court judge, handles the bankruptcy, he might 
conclude that a court under section 301 would bring greater com-
petence to bear on questions of labor relations than he could. Of 
course, by referring these claims to a court sitting under section 301, 
the bankruptcy court agrees to be bound by the decision of that 
forum and the possibility of conflicting orders does not arise. 
The second situation in which the section 30 I court may be 
invoked to resolve claims arising from the rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement is that in which the court of bankruptcy treats 
the union's claims as unliquidated and hence excludes them from 
the final bankruptcy order. Such unliquidated claims are considered 
to be unprovable and are therefore not discharged by the final 
order.81 Thus these claims remain enforceable against the employer 
in a suit under section 301 even after the bankruptcy proceedings 
have been concluded. The bankruptcy court might follow this 
course of action if it felt that the union claims were without merit, 
that they were simply not susceptible to liquidation, or that con-
sideration of those claims would unreasonably delay the bankruptcy 
proceedings. Regardless of the reason, in a case in which a union's 
claims are excluded, as unprovable, from the final order of the 
79. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964). "[N]o judge or trustee acting under this title shall 
change the wages or working conditions of Railroad employees except in a manner 
prescribed in the Railway Labor Act." Bankruptcy Act § 77n, II U.S.C. § 205(n) (1964). 
80. NLRA §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1964). Bankruptcy Act § 272, II U.S.C. § 672 
(1964). 
81. The basis for a creditor's presentation of a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding is 
Bankruptcy Act§ 57d, II U.S.C. § 93(d) (1964): "Claims which have been duly proved 
shall be allowed upon receipt by or upon presentation to the court, unless objections 
to their allowance shall be made by the parties in interest." The union's claim, how-
ever, arising from the rejection, would be in the nature of an unliquidated claim; 
and a provision to § 57d states that such a claim "shall not be allowed if the court 
shall determine that it is not capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation." 11 
U.S.C. § 9l!(d) (1964). Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the collective bargaining 
agreement was rejected and thereby breached, the bankruptcy court might dismiss a 
union's claim for damages resulting from that breach. However, any claim so dis• 
missed would not be discharged by the final order of the bankruptcy court. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35, (1964). Thus an enforceable claim would survive the 
bankruptcy and could be the basis of a § 301 suit by the union. 
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bankruptcy court, an action under section 301 is available to the 
union. Utilized in this manner, the section 301 court can comple-
ment the bankruptcy court in order to protect the interests of the 
union without interfering with the proceedings in bankruptcy. 
Whether the relief for the rejection of the collective bargaining 
agreement is to be fashioned by the bankruptcy court or by the 
section 301 court sitting in one of the two situations discussed above, 
, the question of the appropriate remedy arises. It has been suggested 
above that the full range of equitable powers should be used to 
provide a suitable remedy. For instance, a remedial order might 
incorporate those terms of the rejected collective bargaining agree-
ment which would not jeopardize the bankrupt's liquidation or 
reorganization, 82 and which represent substantial union or employee 
rights. In any event, a court, in fashioning a remedy for the partic-
ular case, must make an effort to balance the needs of bankruptcy 
administration with the policies behind the federal labor laws. 
In seeking specific performance of the rejected contract's arbi-
tration provision in Turney, the union might be said to have sought 
an inappropriate remedy. In a fundamental sense, a claim for 
specific performance goes beyond seeking a remedy for breach. 
Indeed, since specific performance amounts to enforcement of the 
rejected contract, that remedy, if carried to the extreme, could 
frustrate the whole purpose of rejection-to free the bankrupt from 
the burdens of an existing contract. 
In seeking specific performance, the union was, in effect, at-
tempting to establish a new labor concept-the successor doctrine83 
-in cases in which a trustee in bankruptcy is the succeeding em-
ployer. The successor doctrine, announced by the Supreme Court 
in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,84 reflects a general concern for 
the protection of employees from such changes in employment con-
ditions as result from corporate sale or merger. In the Wiley case, 
the Court held that "the disappearance by merger of a corporate 
employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the 
employees covered by the agreement, and that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with 
82. For example, if the trustee rejected the union contract in order to escape 
burdensome featherbedding provisions, the court's ruling could require that those 
employees who were retained by the trustee during the continued operations of the 
bankrupt be employed in accordance with the reasonable wage and seniority terms of 
the rejected contract, since those terms were not themselves harmful to the bankrupt. 
Any terms thus incorporated in a court's order would control the employment relation 
pending negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement between the trustee and 
the union. 
83. See generally Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 
63 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 735 (1969). 
84. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
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with the union under the agreement."85 That statement went a 
step beyond previous NLRB decisions which had held that after 
termination of a union contract, an employer's action in making 
unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment with-
out negotiating with the union was an unfair labor practice. 86 The 
successor doctrine recognizes that although the normal operation 
of contract law would not bind a successor to the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, such an agreement is not an ordinary 
contract. 87 Furthermore, according to the doctrine, federal labor 
policy requires that the successor assume the employer's duties un-
der the union contract, including arbitration when it is provided.88 
The reasoning seems to be that if a bargaining obligation survives 
a succession, there is no reason why the collective bargaining agree-
ment should not also be binding on the successor, insofar as the 
terms are reasonable.89 
The union sought a holding in the Turney case that the arbi-
tration terms survived the trustee's rejection of the union contract.90 
While the court might well have ordered independent arbitration 
of the dispute as a remedy in such a case, clearly the terms of the 
rejected contract were unenforceable.91 Thus, the court in Tur-
ney could easily have denied the union's specific-performance re-
quest on the ground that no enforceable contract existed after 
rejection.92 
85. 376 U.S. at 548. 
86. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra. 
87. 376 U.S. at 550. 
88. See Goldberg, supra note 83. 
89, See Goldberg, supra note 83, at 811-12. 
90. A recent case has held that successorship doctrine is generally inapplicable in a 
bankruptcy situation. See Eastern Freightways, Inc. v. Local Union No. 707, 300 F. 
Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a/fd., CCH BANKR. L. REP. 1J 63,348 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1970). 
91. However, since both a bankruptcy court and a district court sitting under § 301 
have full equity powers, whatever forum properly assumed jurisdiction of the union's 
suit could certainly have included some of the terms of the rejected contract in its 
remedial order. See note 69 supra and note 82 supra and accompanying text. 
For an argument that the successorship doctrine should apply to collective bar-
gaining agreements in the bankruptcy context and that arbitration under such con-
tracts should be enforced, see Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 
S. CAL. L. REv. 477 (1969). That Comment argues that the arbitrator is in a position 
to modify the tenns of the agreement to prevent an unreasonable burden on the bank-
rupt estate, and it bases its argument on Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 
F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964). Generally, however, the Reliance case's statement of the free-
dom of the arbitrator has not been interpreted so broadly. See Goldberg, supra note 
83, at 780-83. Goldberg's view appears to be the sounder one in view of the traditional 
restriction of the basis for an arbitrator's award to the basic terms of the contract. In 
any event, the necessity for relying on the arbitration provision of the old collective 
bargaining agreement is obviated by a full appreciation of the role of the bankruptcy 
court and the possibility of resort to an action under § 301. 
92. Of course it might also have declined to exercise jurisdiction under § 301 as an 
improper forum. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra. 
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Although the court recognized that the trustee had a right to 
reject the agreement and consequently that specific performance 
should not be awarded, it erred in failing to recognize that rejection 
constitutes a breach. Not realizing that the union's suit under 
section 301 was essentially for breach-the violation of a collective 
bargaining agreement-the court simply dismissed the action. The 
dismissal of the union's suit for specific performance may have then 
caused the court to feel that the union was without a remedy for 
the trustee's departure from the terms of the rejected contract, and 
that feeling may have contributed to the court's subsequent willing-
ness in Durand to accept the Board's characterization of the trustee's 
departure as an unfair labor practice. The court's construction of 
the scope of unfair labor practices to include a departure from the 
terms of a rejected contract appears to have been an effort to pro-
vide some protection of union rights that were not adequately 
protected and thus to fill a remedial void that was due to the court's 
own earlier failure both to recognize its ability and obligation as a 
court of bankruptcy to protect the interests expressed in the federal 
labor policy and to realize the proper role of an action under section 
301. Should a departure from the terms of a rejected contract be 
considered a unilateral change and thus an unfair labor practice, 
the utility of rejection under the Bankruptcy Act could be seriously 
impaired.93 For this reason and for those discussed above, the bank-
ruptcy court, or a section 301 court in limited situations, should be 
recognized as the appropriate forum to redress injury caused by a 
trustee's authorized rejection of a collective bargaining agreement 
and his departure from its terms. 
93. See note 59 supra and text accompanying notes 28, 64 supra. 
